One week with Fiona Macpherson
Katedra filozofie FF TU s potešením oznamuje študentom, že v rámci One week with budeme mať tento semester príležitosť privítať medzi nami Prof. Fionu Macpherson z Department of Philosophy Glasgow University.
Prof. Macpherson vyštudovala filozofiu na Glasgow University, St. Andrews, Harvarde a v Stirlingu. Pôsobila na univerzitách Stirling, St. Andrews, Cambridge, Australian National University, University of London a Umea Universitet. Je autorkou množstva vedeckých štúdií z oblasti filozofie percepcie a je editorkou: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour (with Derek Brown),
forthcoming, Routledge; Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory (with Fabian Dorsch),
forthcoming, Oxford University Press; Phenomenal Presence (with Fabian Dorsch and Martine Nida - Rumelin), forthcoming,
Oxford University Press; Representationalism (with Dimitris Platchias), forthcoming, MIT Press; Hallucination : Philosophy and Psychology (with Dimitris Platchias), 2013,
MIT Press; The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives 2011,
Oxford University Press; The Admissible Contents of Experience (with Katherine Hawley), 2011, Wiley –
Blackwell; The Philosophical Quarterly , Volume 59, Issue 236 (July 2009); Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (with Adrian Haddock), 2008,
Oxford University Press.
Od roku 2004 je riaditeľkou The Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience na univerzite v škótskom Glasgowe. Na FF TU prednesie sériu prednášok, ktoré budú zároveň tvoriť predmet Philosophy of Perception, ktorý si môžu študenti zvoliť ako PV, resp. V predmet (kód FIm099, 6 kr) a absolvovať ho za obvyklých podmienok.
September 28th, 2015 (MON), 10.00 – 12.30, 3P1: Illusion and Hallucination
What is the nature of illusion and hallucination? How have these phenomena shaped the philosophy of perception?
Macpherson, F. (2013) "The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction", in Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, edited by F. Macpherson and D. Platchais, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
September 28th, 2015 (MON), 14:30 – 16.30, 3P1: A Disjunctive Theory of Introspection
I argue that zombies and Anton’s syndrome give one reason to be a disjunctivist about introspection –and not about perception.
Macpherson F. (2010) "A Disjunctive Theory of Introspection: A Reflection on Zombies and Anton's Syndrome", Philosophical Issues, 20(1): 226-265.
September 29th, (2015 (TUE), 10.00 – 12.00, 3P1: Individuating the Senses
What differentiate the senses, how are they related, and how many are there? I examine evidence from standard and unusual human and animal perception.
Macpherson, F. (2011) "Individuating the Senses", in her (ed.) The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press.
September 29th, 2015 (TUE), 14.00 – 16.00, 3P1: The Space of Sensory Modalities
Is there are space of sensory modalities—space in which we can represent all the different actual and many of the possible senses? I discuss the difficulties in constructing such a space and show what such an enterprise might bring to our understanding of the senses.
Macpherson, F. (2014) "The Space of Sensory Modalities", in Perception and Its Modalities, D. Stokes, S. Biggs and M. Matthen (eds.), Oxford University Press.
September 30th, 2015 (WED), 10.00 – 12.30, 3P1: The Cognitive Penetration of Experience
Do our beliefs and desires affect our perceptual experience? What is the evidence that this occurs, why is it difficult to adjudicate, and why does it matter if it does? I examine the case of colour perception and the case of imagination’s effects on perception.
Macpherson, F. (2012) "Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1): 24-62.
October 1st, 2015 (THU), 10:00 – 12:30, 3P1: “Cognitive Penetration and the Content of Experience: Absence, Volume, and Beauty”
What is the content of our experience? Does it include absences, three-dimensional objects and volumes, properties like beauty? What else? If it does, how does such content enter our experience? Is there any limit to the nature of our experience?
October 1st, 2015 (THU), 14:00 – 15:00, 3P1: Philosophy at Glasgow University.
Informal department colloquium
October 2nd, 2015 (FRI), 10:00 – 12:30, 3P1: The Structure of Experience
Do our experiences have structure? What is that structure? How can we establish that it does? I examine these questions by focusing on the case of experience of form without colour. In so doing I explore blindsight, and other unusual perceptual phenomena that science is revealing.
Macpherson, F (2015) "The Structure of Experience, the Nature of the Visual, and Type 2 Blindsight", Consciousness and Cognition, 32:104 - 128.